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EXTERNAL RESERVE MANAGEMENT:
OVERVIEW AND PERFORMANCE OF MAJOR ASSET
CTASSES FOR THE PERIOD 2OOO -2016
monogement proctices con hove

strotegies ore olso used to monoge
the reserves portfolio. However, o

reputotionol costs (lMF,

few centrol bonks employ octive
monogement strotegies ocross o

significont finonciol ond

Mujtobo Muhommod Forouk
Principol Monoger, Reserves

Monogement Deportment
Centrol Bonk of Nigerio

2013).

Centrol bonks therefore rely on on
oppropriote Strotegic Asset
Allocotion (SAA) which involves
currency composition, choice of
investment instruments, durotion
of the reserves portfolio, degree of
credit ond morket risk.ln doing this,
country's specific circumstonces
ore required to ensure thot ossets

ovoiloble ond support morket

Reserve monogement olso

requires the ochievement of the
following objectives:

i. Avoilobility of odequote

Senior Monoger, Reserves

Monogement Deportment
Centrol Bonk of Nigerio

I.

Reserve monogement

ii.

foreign exchonge reserves to
meet o defined ronge of
objectives;
Control in o prudent monner,

liquidity, morket, credit,
operotionol ond other risks;
ond

iii. Subject to liquidity ond other

constroints, generote
reosonoble risk-odjusted

INTRODUCTION
is

o process

thot ensures the ovoilobility ond
control of odequote officiol public
sector f oreign ossets by the
relevont outhorities for meeting o
defined ronge of objectives for o
country or o union (lMF. 2013). lt is
therefore o port of the officiol
public policies, ond must be in line

with ochieving the notionol
economic objectives. However,

the size of the externol reserves go

o long woy in determining the
strotegy used in its monogement.

To ensure thot externol reserves

meet the obove-stoted

objectives, os well os increose o
country's resilience to shocks. there

A number of popers hove been

written on different ospects of
externol reserves monogement.
These include o comprehensive
poper by Nugee (2000) of the
Cenier for Centrol Bonking Studies

ore sofeguorded, reodily of the

confidence.

Abdurrohmon Abdullohi

wider ronge of osset closses.

returns over the medium- to
long-term on the invested
funds.

The ochievement of the obove
objectives entoils the choice of
oppropriote osset closses. These
include both short-term ossets thot
will provide liquidity, os well os
medium- to long-term ossels thot
will yield returns, subject to other
constroints. These osset closses
include cosh ond neor-cosh;fixed

Bonk of Englond thot
discussed vorious ospect of
externol reserves monogement
such os reosons f or holding
externol reserves, ownership issues,
selecting o benchmork, liquidity
monogement, use of externol
monogers, etc. Others include the

degree of osset closs

diversificotion between centrol
bonks ond sovereign weolth fund
by Aizenmon ond Glick (201a);
monoging f oreign exchonge
reserves during ond ofter period of
crisis by McCouley ond Rigoudy

(2016): importonce of
ond mercontilist
motives of holding externol
precoutionory

reserves by Aizenmon ond Lee
(2007); the impoct of o chonge in
externol reserves holding on

investment, inflotion ond

exchonge rote (Abdulloteef ond
Woheed (2010) ond importonce of
risk monogement ond its vorious
ospects in monoging centrol bonk
foreign reserves by the Europeon
Centrol Bonk (2004). However, to
the best of our knowledge, no
poper compiled ond discussed in
detoil the vorious osset closses
ovoiloble to externol reserve

income; gold; equities ond

monogers.

reserve monogers employ

The objective of this poper is to
discuss in detoil vorious osset
closses ovoiloble to both octive
ond possive reserves monogers
ond onolyse the performonce of
the osset closses held mosfly by
centrol bonks. The rest of the poper

derivotives. Most centrol bonk

c o n se rvo tive in ves t m e n t
strotegies. which involve investing

in mostly cosh ond neor-cosh
ossets, os well os fixed income
instruments. Possive (indexotion)

is the need for o sound
monogement of externol reserves,
ond semi-octive (enhoncedos weok or risky reserves indexotion)
monogement
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structured os follows:Section two

Humon resource skills ond

reviewed literoture on reserves
monogement, including motives
ond whot guides the decisions of
the investment committee in

expertise olso determines whether
o centrol bonk would odopt o

determining osset closses. Section
three onolysed the vorious osset
closses thol reserves monogers

reserves ossets.

invest in, while section four
evoluotes the mojor centrol bonks'
osset closses' performonce over
the lost fifteen yeors covering the
period before ond ofter the 2008
globol finonciol crisis. Section five
concludes the poper.

2. EXTERNAL

RESERVES

MANAGEMENT: THEORETICAL AND

possive, semi-octive or octive
strotegy in monoging externol

According to the lnternotionol
Monetory Fund (lMF, 2013) ond
Nugee (2000), countries hold
externol reserves in order to
support o ronge of notionol
objectives. These include, to:

3.0

EXTERNAL RESERVES

MANAGEMENT

Externol reserves, olso known os

the IMF (2009) os "those externol
ossets thot ore reodily ovoiloble to
ond controlled by monetory
outhorities for meeting bolonce of
poyments finoncing needs, for
intervention in foreign exchonge
morkets to offect the currency
exchonge rote, ond for other

reloted purposes (such os
mointoining confidence in the

currency ond the economy, ond
serving os o bosis for foreign
borrowing)". Monchev (2009)
defines it to "include gold ond/or
other centrol bonk's ossets which
come entirely within its control ond
ore eosy to trode on internotionol
finonciol morkets". Thus, externol
reserves conslst of liquid or eosily
morketoble f oreign currency
ossets, held in the f orm of
convertible f oreign currency
cloims of the monetory outhorities

porticulor closs ore expected to

exhibit similor risk-return

chorocteristics. Mojor osset

closses ore bonds, equities, cosh-

equivolents. derivotives,

commodities ond reol estote.
The osset closses in which most
centrol bonks invest ore discussed
below:
Cosh & Neor-cosh

One of the objectives of reserves
monogement is to mointoin
odequote liquidity to meet doy-

to-doy officiol tronsoctions

EMPIRICAL ISSUES

internotionol reserves, f orelgn
reserves or foreign exchonge
reseryes, hove been defined by

feotures. lnstruments included in o

3.1

CLASSES IN

ASSET

An osset closs is o group of
investments thot hove similor

Country

External

Reserues

(Billion)

Level

as at

Reserves

Reserves

Management

Features/Techniques

Management

Asset Classes

Oblective

endJune 2015
Botswana

ussS 413

Bank Managed

External reserves are dtvtded tnto

Safety, lrqurdrty

Lrqurdrty Portfolro

and return.

the Pula Fund (long-term).

and

Return

Use of External Asset Managers to

bonds

htghest

enhance returns and garn skrlls

Pula
rs

Fund

the

(short -term)

tiquidity
and

Portfolio: Cash
short -term
Pula Fund . Long-

obJectrve

term b onds and
eq

Brazr

I

uss372 168

u rtr

es

Safety, lrqurdrty

Actrve management of external

Overnrght

and profrtabrlrty

reserves under a detarled benchmark

deposrts, money

and gurdelrnes

market and frxed

Use of External Asset Managers to

rncome

garn addrtronal skrlls

po

rtfol os,
r

Brazrlran
soverergn

external debt,
Chrna

uss3,693,840 00

Safety, Iqurdrty

The bulk of Chrna's external reserves

and return under

are managed by the State

bonds, equrtres

SAFE,

Admrnrstratron of Forergn Exchange

and alternatrve

(sAFE).

rnvestments

Return

rs

the malor

objectrve under

It ls run as a subsrdrary under the

Chrna lnvestment

PBoC

Company (ClC),

A portron of the external reserves

Chrna's Soverergn

under SAFE

Wealth Fund

asset manaBers

rs

outsourced to external

Another portron of the reserves

on non-residents.

Cash, soverergn

rs

managed by ClC, a semr -rndependent
government frrm rn order to rmprove

Centrol bonks oround the world
hove somewhot similor motives for
holding ond monoging externol

returns.
lndra

uss330,50r.

reserves. Whot

dif f erentiotes
them, however, is the investment

Lrqurdrty, safety

External reserves managed as money

and return

market portfolro

-term) and
bond market portfolro (long-term).

lMoney market,
soverergn bonds,
and gold

A portron of external reserves rs

strotegy or techniques of
monoging the ossets. This is moinly
dictoted by o number of foctors.
For instonce the lorger or robust
the level of reserves, the more
diversified would be the portfolio.

(short

managed by External Asset Managers
Norway

uss52 537

Bank managed

Bank managed external reserves splrt

Safety, lrqurdrty

rnto four

and return

long-term (rnvestment),

frxed rncome

rmmunrzatron and Petroleum Fund

assets, ftnanctal

buffer portfolros.

deflvatrves

Source IMF (2013), Bloomberg (2015)

3

sub

-portfolros Lrqurdrty;

Cash, equrtres;

bonds and other
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(poyment to foreign missions, or corporotion). Bonds, generolly
foreign exchonge morket known os flxed income ossets, ore
intervention, etc) ond other finonciol cloims with promised

3.2.3

unforeseen needs. To ochieve this
objective, o porlion of lhe reserves
needs to be kept in cosh or neorcosh ossets, being the most liquid
in osset closses. Cosh ossets ore
currencies ond coins of hond,
bonk bolonces, ond negotioble
(money) orders ond cheques.
Neor-cosh on the other hond, is
onything thot con be converted
into cosh in the short-term. They
constitute low-risk investments thot
con be quickly liquidoted into
cosh or cosh-like ossets of short
notice, thus devoid of either
covorionce or liquidity risk (Duchin
et ol, 201 4). Exomples of neor-cosh
ossets ore:

include:

treosury bills (t-bills): short-term

obligotions issued by the
centrol government with o
thon one yeorin order
to odjust the bolonce of the
treosury.
term

f

less

ixed term deposit

(FTD)

:

deposit with c bonk for o
specified period of time of o
specified interest rote which
con be withdrown by the
depositor upon moturity. The
bonk normolly chorges the
depositor if the deposit is
terminoted prior to moturity.
repurchose ogreement (repo) :
o tronsoction whereby o porty
sells security with o
commitment to buy bock from
the purchoser of o specified
interest rote ond moturity

cosh flows (coupons) of known
fixed omount poid of fixed dotes.
The term fixed refers to both the
noture of the poyment, which is
scheduled, os well os the omount
poid. The US bond morket is the
lorgest in the world, ond consist of
six sectors. These ore the treosury,
ogency, municipol, corporote,

Bonds

Governments ond corporotions
usuolly roise f inonce through

borrowing. This borrowing

mortgoge sectors (Fobozzi,

sovereign governments. These
include the United Stotes (US)
notes ond bonds; Joponese

Government Bonds (JGBs);
Germon Bonds ond United
Kingdom (UK) Gilts, omong
others. The treosury morket is
the most liquid securities
morket. Thot is, there is olwoys

20 l 3).

enough volume of securities
ond buyers/sellers to obsorb

Flooting-rote bonds hove coupon

ony order. This liquidity is os o
result of the totol volue of
bonds outstonding ond the
lorge number of morket
porticiponts.

which fluctuotes bosed on o
ref erence rote. Zero-coupon
bonds poy no coupon of oll. Also,
step-up notes hove coupon thot
increoses overtime.

3.2.2

Feotures of Bonds

Bonds hove some specific

feotures. These include:

i.
ii.

iii.

lssuer: this is the entlty thot
borrows the money.

Principol: this is the totol
omount borrowed.
Technicolly, it is referred to os
the moturity-volue or focevolue of the bond thot the
issuer borrows, ond must be
repoid to the lender.
Coupon: this is the onnuol
interest rote the issuer poys to
the subscribers of the bond
during its life, ond is expressed
os o percentoge of the

principol. While most US
bonds poy coupons semi-

onnuolly, bonds issued in the

Eurobond morket poy

iv.

to poy bock the omount
borrowed on o specified time
period. Therefore, o bond is on v.

instrument through which on
investor (bond holder) lends
money to on entity (government

Treosury Securities: issued by

It should be noted thot not oll
bonds hove f ixed coupons.

is

normolly through bond issuonce.
The term bond implies thot, the
borrower hos o binding obligotion

l.

osset-bocked securities ond

While these ossets hove very low
risk, their level of return is olso low.

3.2

Types of Bonds
Bonds ore usuolly identified bosed
on the type of the issuer. They

coupons onnuolly (Fobozzi, F.
J. ond Monn, S.V,2005).
Moturity: this is the end period
of the bond, when the issuer
must return the principol to
the investors. This indicotes
the expected life of the bond,
ond the number of periods
the holder receives coupon
poyment.
lndenture: this is the controct
document thot stipulotes oll
the terms of the bond.

4

ii.

Federol Agency Securities:
These ore f ixed income
securities issued by ogencies

by o centrol
government. Some ogency
estoblished

bonds ore explicitly

guoronteed by the full foith
ond credit of the centrol
government. Some hove
implicit guorontee of the
government while some hove
no government guorontee.
iii. Corporote Bonds. These ore
Bonds issued by corporotions.

iv. MunicipolSecurities ore bonds
issued by stotes ond locol
governments.

v. Supronotionol bonds: A
supronotionol is on entity
creoted by sovereign
governments to promote
economic development.

Exomples include the World
Bonk, Africon Development
Bonk, Europeon lnvestmenl
Bonk, lslomic Development
Bonk, etc.

Corporote ond municipol bonds
hove defoult risk. Credit roting (by
roting ogencies) usuolly provides
on indicotion of the likelihood of
defoult. However, supronotionol,

sovereign ond sovereign-

guoronteed bonds ore generolly
considered to be risk-free ond

hove lower volotility. These
quolities underscore the reoson
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why most centrolbonks invest port
of their reseryes in supronotionol,

3.4.1

used

Forwords

to hedge

ogoinst interest

rote ond exchonge rote

invested in this osset closs.

A forword is on instrument whose
controct is negotioted directly
between two porties (buyer ond
seller) for o specific omount ond
delivery dote, otherwise known os
on over-the-counter (OTC)
controct. ln o forword controct,
the buyer ocquires o legol right to
buy on osset of o specific future
time, for o specific omount of o
price fixed todoy.

3.3

3.4.2

exchonged. Thot is, ot initiotion of
the controct, no cosh exchonge
tokes ploce between the porties.
Consequently, ot end of the
controct, there will be no cosh
exchonge oswell.

sovereign ond sovereign-

guoronteed bonds. These bonds
ore considered sofe ond provide o

level of return thot is relotlvely
consistent with the investment
objectives-sofety, liquidity ond
return- of centrol bonks. Funds in
excess of working copitol ond
liquldity needs ore normolly
Equilies (shores)

of osset represents the
copitol contributed by
shoreholders of o compony. The

This closs

term equityis derived from the foct

thot

shoreholders hove equity
stoke in the compony they invest
in.

Equity-holders outomoticolly beor
the risk of the compony; when o
compony performs well, they
shore good dividends. Aport from
little or no dividend poyouts, bod
performonce by o compony
could olso leod to reduction in

shoreholders weolth.

This
reduction is in the form of o foll in
the volue/price of the compony's
shores.

o result of the riskiness of
equities, most centrol bonks do
not invest in equities os port of their
reserves monogement octivities.

As

to

o

forword controct, the mojor

dif f erence being thot it is
stondordized ond troded on on
exchonge. A mojor odvontoge of
futures over forwords is the foct
thot counterporty risk is mitigoted
becouse the exchonge octs os o
cleoring house for the tronsoction.

Derivotives
Derivotives foll under four brood
cotegories. These ore futures,
forwords, options ond swops.
Futures, forwords ond option ore
securities whose volue is derived
from ond depends on the volue of
some underlying ossets. A swop on
the other hond is on ogreement
between two porties to exchonge
o series of cosh flows in the future
(Cuthbertson ond Nitzsche, 2008).

Derivotives ore mostly used for
either hedging by investors in
order to monoge risk or for
speculotion to moke profit.
Due to the conservotive noture of

most centrol bonk they only
in derivotives for

hedging.

As such, reserves monogers
usuolly undertoke interest-rote
ond currency swops. Currency
swop involves the exchonge of
different currencies of initiotion of
the tronsoction.

Sometimes. depending on the
needs of the porties, only the

interest poyments ore

ln interest-rote swop, one porty
poys o fixed rote while the other
porty poys o flooting rote. Both
poyments ore mode in the some

3.4.3 Options
An option involves selling

o

controct by on option-writer to

onother porty (option-holder). The
controct glves rlght to the option
holder to buy (coll)/sell (put) on
osset from/to the option-writer of o
future dote for o fixed price. The
option-holder does not hove to

exercise this right ond for this
privilege, he poys o price - the

premium to the option-write. lf the
option-holder decides to exercise

the right, the option-writer

is

obliged to occept.

3.4

engoge

Futures

Futures controct is similor

risks

(Cuthbertson ond Nitzsche, 2008).

The mojor difference between
forword/futures ond option is thot
while in the former, the buyer/seller
must buy/sell, in the lotter; he hos

the option not to buy/selt. He
therefore hos the option to just

wolk owoy without exercising his
right to buy or sell the osset.
However, he loses the premium the price he poys to get the

currency; this is the moin
difference with the type of
currency swop in which there is no
exchonge of principol omounts.

4.0 RESERVES

ASSETS

PERFORMANCE

Centrol bonks, ond especiolly
those from emerging ond
developing economies usuolly
invest in or hold most of their
foreign ossets in short-term
instruments (cosh, fixed term
deposits, certificote of deposits
ond treosury bills) os well os fixed
income ossets (sovereign, ogency
ond supro-notionol bonds). This
ollows them to meet their liquidity
requirements of short notice os
well os eorn income without
indulging in unnecessory risks. This
poper therefore focuses on the
review of these two osset closses
due to thelr importonce to centrol
bonks.

option.

3.4.4 Swops
A swop is on over the
(OTC) controct

counter

thot involves the

exchonge of cosh flows between
two porties of o series of specified
future dotes. Generolly, swop is
customized to meet porties'
specific needs. They ore primorily
5

Over the lost fifteen yeors, the
performonce of these mojor
segments of externol reserves

ossets hove chonged

tremendously, highlighting the
chollenges of monoging externol
reserves omong centrol bonks. As
o result of which mony centrol
bonks hove sought for other
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olternotive osset closses in order to
improve eornings, while stoying
within risk oppetite, os public
sector investors. However, given
thot centrol bonks use indices to
meosure the performonce of their
portfolios, this poper will use the
mojor bond ond Treosury bills (Tbills) indices os proxies to meosure

oggregote demond, with the
reduction in interest rote of the
front burner (Snyder, 201 I ).

E.m

2015

month deposits, ond in July 2009
for the GBP ond Euro rotes, ond
ore yet to move to single digit. Thls
wos due to o number of policy

onaY

?.m

6&

the performonce of these osset

P

closses.

C

s.E

tLo
4. 1

Short-term lnslruments

G

As stoted eorlier, this closs of osset

includes money morket
instruments ronging from

to one yeor
treosury bills. Centrol bonks
overnight deposits

mointoin these osset closses

order

in

to meet their short-term

requirements. Before the globol
finonciol crisis of 2008, o 3-month
deposits rotes in most odvonced
economieswere obove orclose lo
five percent. For instonce, US$ 3month deposit rotes overoged
6.51 percent in 2000. while GBP
ond Euro 3-month deposit rotes
overoged 6.lO ond 4.13 percent,
respectively.
There wos however o drop in
money morket rotes in these mojor
economies, with the USD rote
folling the most. The moin reoson
for the foll in money morket roles
wos the collopse of the internet
bubble (populorly known os the
dot.com bubble) which took

ploce between 1999 ond 2001.
Between 1997 ond 2000, stock
morkets in the industriolized world

experienced ropid growth

e3@

tr

t

t.oo

1S

BEE

Source Bloomberg (20'16)

However, the exponsionory
monetory ond fiscol policies of low
interest rotes ond tox cuts for
middle ond upper incomes led to
increosed inflotionory pressures. To
rein-in inflotion, the US Federol

developed ond developing
economies oimed of boosting
growth through the reduction of
policy rotes to neorzero.

5.fl)
4.m
P

e

3.m

r

t

!.u)

C

n

1.(D

t

equity volue in the internet sector
ond reloted fields. When the
bubble collopsed between 1999

&

equity morket. Consequently, the
United Stotes (US) economy
entered o recession. ln response,
the US emborked on eosy fiscol
ond monelory policies in order to
eose credit creotion ond boost

meosures by centrol bonks in both

Th: BofA Mrrrill Lynch Eurp Tnarury Bill lndu - Jen

q

experienced shorp decline in
shore volue ond eornings. The
September 2011 ottock on the
World Trode Center in New York
exocerboted the situotion in the

i]

ll.Bt

in

ond 2001, some componies
shutdown while others

g S BE E B S €B B E 8 BSS== :I ! :=

tr0)

€

o

A
l
Bo{A

h

&

6
A

M.rrllLyI[h EuroT.rEr.y

lll

lrdc(

-Thr
Source Bloomberg (2016)

Reserve Bonk increosed interest
rotes ropidly: from one percent in
Moy 2004 to 5.25 percent in June

2006. Consequently, money
morket ond other morket rotes
olso rose, ond continued until the
end of 2007. Wth the on-set of the
sub-prime defoult thot culminoted
in the globolfinonciolcrisis of 2008,
rotes plummeted below single
digits in Moy 2009 for the USD 36

However, the exponsionory
monetory ond fiscol policies of low

interest rotes ond tox cuts for
middle ond upper incomes led to
increosed inflotionory pressures.
To rein-in inflotion, the US Federol
Reserve Bonk increosed interest
rotes ropidly: from one percent in
Moy 2004 to 5.25 percent in June
2006. Consequenily, money
morket ond other morket rotes
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olso rose, ond continued until the
end of 2007. Wnh the on-set of the
sub-prime defoult thot culminoted
in the globolfinonciol crisis of 2008,

rotes plummeled below single
digits in Moy 2009 for the USD 3month deposits, ond in July 2009
for the GBP ond Euro rotes, ond
ore yet to move to single digit. This
wos due to o number of policy
meosures by centrol bonks in both

developed ond developing

economies oimed of boosting
growth through the reduction of
policy rotes to neorzero.
Treosury bills (T-bills) olso exhibited

similor trend. Since the beginning
of 2015, money morket rotes in the
Euro oreo (including T-bills) hove
gone into negotive territory. This is

due to policy meosures
introduced by the Europeon

Centrol Bonk (ECB) in mid-2014,
oimed ot toming disinflotionory
pressures ond boosting growth.
These include the ECB moving its
deposit rote into negotive territory,
purchose of covered bonds ond
exponding its osset purchose

progromme to include

government bonds ond ossetbocked securities (Bech ond
Molkhozov, 2016). ln spite of this
low interest rote regimes in
developed money morket
economies, centrol bonks hove to
hold these ossets due to the
obsence of relioble olternotives
thot could meet their liquidity
requirements in the emerging
morket economies.

4.2

percent in terms of yields. But,
given thot they ore olso finonciol
instruments,

ln oddition to money

morket

instruments, centrol bonks olso
hold fixed income ossets in the
form of government, supro-

notionol ond governmenl-

bocked bonds in order to eorn

extro income obove whot money
morket instruments could offer.
These ore usuolly medium- ond

long-term securities thot
governments issue to finonce their
octivities. An onolysis of these
bonds' indlces shows thot before
the finonciol crisis of 2008, these
bonds used to offer up to seven

in

somewhot similor pottern os the
money morket instruments. Prior to
the finonciol crisis, sovereign 1-3
yeor (G-7 excluding ltoly) bonds.
1-3 yeor US Agency bonds ond I -3
yeor Supro-notionol bonds yield
between 5-7 percent. The yields
declined os o result of the dot.com
bubble burst, ond then recovered
ond peoked oround 2007, before
the 2008 finonciol crisis set-in.
During the crisis, centrol bonks
emborked on unconventionol

government debts. Emerging

morket bonds now constitute on
importont osset closs in centrol
bonks' foreign reserve portfolio.
They include both locol ond US
Dollor, ond ore issued by both
governments ond corporote
orgonizotions. Chino, Brozil ond
lndio dominote the emerging
morket bond issues, occounting

monetory policy, while

governments injected liquidity

for 50 percent of

through fiscol stimulus plons oimed
of boosting economic growth ond
propping-up inflotion. The
implementotion of neor zero
interest rotes in oddition to osset
purchose progrommes by vorious
odvonced ond emerging morket
economies led to on oll-time low
yield for finonciol ossets. Bond
yields croshed below single digit in

outstonding
morket copitollzotion of EM locol
currency debt ot end-20I 3
(Klingebiel, 2014).

Conclusion

Centrol bonks oround the globe
hove os one of their core
mondote the monogement of
externol ossets in order to protect
the domestic volue of theirvorious
currencies. These externol ossets
ore held ln sofe ond liquid foreign

most odvonced economies,
posing serious chollenges to

externol reserve monogement
omong centrolbonks.
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they behove

emerging morket bonds storted
goining prominence omong
centrol bonkers becouse of their
higher yield ond rising credit
quolity. ln oddition, developed
morket bonds seem to be losing
their riskless stotus becouse of
heightened risk due to increosed
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ln on ottempt to increose income

ond preserve the volue of their
portf olio, reserves monogers
looked for relotively low-risk, hlgher
yielding ossets in emerging morket

(EM) economies. As such,
7

instruments in order to meet the
objectives of liquidity, sofety ond
return. Given the conservotive
nofure of centrol bonks, they
invest mostly in sofe government
treosuries to eorn returns. os well os
money morket instruments to

Volume 40 No

Jonuory - Morch 20l6

I

to identify other
thot could be included to

meet their liquidity objectives.

the globol finonciol morkets, os

centrol bonks

Over the yeors, the yields on ihese
ossets fluctuote depending on the

well os to meet their objectives.
ln conclusion, the poper noted the

ossets

globol mocroeconomic

conditions. Centrol bonks modify
the ossets in their portfolio to suit
the chonging circumstonces in

emergence of emerging morket
debt os o mojor osset closs in

reserves monogement. We

recommend further studies by

further diversify the reserves. This

is

importont, given the decline in EM
yield, low yield environment in the
US ond UK, ond the negotive
interest regime in the Euro oreo.
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